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Abstract This paper presents a novel security mod-
elling language and a set of original analysis techniques,
for capturing and analysing security requirements for
cloud computing environments. The novelty of the lan-
guage lies in the integration of concepts from cloud com-
puting, with concepts from security and goal-oriented re-
quirements engineering to elicit, model and analyse se-
curity requirements for cloud infrastructures. We then
propose three analysis techniques, which support an au-
tomated process where given a model of a cloud comput-
ing systems, developed with the proposed language, will
enhance the model with new security knowledge, for ex-
ample threats and vulnerabilities, mitigation strategies
and assets and actor responsibilities. This is, to the best
of our knowledge, the first attempt in the literature to
develop a language for cloud computing security mod-
elling and analysis, based on such integration and sup-
port it with a set of automated techniques that enhanced
the stakeholder created models with security knowledge.
The proposed modelling language and techniques are il-
lustrated through walking examples and a case study
based on our work in the VisiOn European project.
1 Introduction
The premise of the cloud computing paradigm is that
computing resources are offered by third party providers
as a form of commodity accessed through network con-
nections [7]. In comparison to traditional IT solutions,
this lowers capital costs and abstracts away implementa-
tion and infrastructure details by allowing cloud users to
select from pre-configured computing services. However
one of the prerequisites for cloud computing; outsourc-
ing data and processes to third parties, raises several
security [8,27] and legal questions [9]. To the cloud user,
cloud computing is a black box where the user has little
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to no control over how or where their data is processed.
In order to understand the security issues in cloud com-
puting environments, developers need to capture and de-
scribe components interconnected through multiple con-
ceptual layers, such as data, cloud services and cloud
infrastructure. In order for cloud service providers to ser-
vice multiple cloud users, multi-tenancy is an important
architecture in cloud computing. Multi-tenancy refers to
multiple cloud users running independent logical pro-
cesses but sharing the same physical components, such
as CPU, RAM and storage. Multi-tenancy in cloud com-
puting systems is enabled through virtualisation. Vir-
tualisation is the enabling technology for virtual ma-
chines, which emulates a physical server and is managed
through software known as hypervisors. Therefore a sin-
gle physical server can host a hypervisor managing one or
more virtual machines. Each virtual machine is then al-
located to a cloud user and runs cloud services. However
from a cloud computing context, the mutual distrust in
multi-tenancy environments brings up questions about
the security of user data when sharing physical infras-
tructure [10]. For example consider the scenario where
two companies are using virtual machines hosted on the
same physical server. A virtual machine escape vulner-
ability [12] can be exploited, enabling one company to
access the sensitive data of another company. This at-
tack has been practically demonstrated in [13], in order
to extract information from a target co-residing virtual
machine.
Our work provides benefits to a number of users in-
cluding those involved in the process of securing cloud
computing systems, such as organisational stakeholders
that wish to migrate aspects of their business system
to the cloud; security engineers modelling and analysing
cloud environments and cloud users that wish to have a
better understanding of the security challenges in cloud
systems. Therefore in the context of this paper, we re-
fer to the term developers as the users of our work, for
example organisational stakeholders and cloud security
engineers under their employment.
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Fig. 1 Outline of the secure cloud requirements elicitation
process.
The work presented in this paper is part of a doctoral
thesis and has been refined through several iterations of
published work, the latest appearing in [14]. The work
in [14] focuses on describing the components and proper-
ties of the proposed cloud modelling language, which has
been refined over the course of research, in order to cap-
ture cloud domain-specific concepts. This paper builds
upon this work and presents a novel modelling language
that uniquely combines concepts from cloud computing,
security engineering and goal-oriented requirements en-
gineering [11], a machine-readable syntax in order to fa-
cilitate semi-automated reasoning through tool-support,
and a concrete syntax, which maps graphical notation
to each of the concepts in the language. This is pro-
posed in order to address the need for semi-automated
tool-support, which would assist requirement engineers
to model and discover the security issues and solutions in
cloud computing environments. The paper also presents
a set of original analysis techniques, which support an
automated process where given a model of a cloud com-
puting systems, developed with the proposed language,
will enhance the model with new security knowledge, for
example threats and vulnerabilities, mitigation strate-
gies and assets and actor responsibilities.
This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first at-
tempt in the literature to develop a language for cloud
computing security modelling and analysis, based on
such integration and support it with a set of automated
techniques that enhanced the stakeholder created models
with security knowledge. In particular, our contributions
in this paper are as follows:
– C1 : A cloud meta-model aligning concepts between
security engineering, goal-based requirements engi-
neering and cloud computing.
– C2 : A modelling language describing cloud comput-
ing concepts, relationships and properties.
– C3 : A machine-readable syntax notation to unam-
biguously describe the modelling language.
– C4 : Three security analysis techniques; cloud secu-
rity analysis, security mitigation analysis, and trans-
parency analysis.
The overall aim of the work is to provide a decision
support framework enabling developers to elicit cloud se-
curity requirements from cloud computing environments.
The purpose of the framework is to provide an integrated
set of domain-specific concepts and functionality, which
enables the systematic application of a rigorously de-
fined process. In the doctoral thesis we have described a
framework consisting of a modelling language, the secure
cloud process to systematically apply the concepts to the
system-under-design and techniques to facilitate semi-
automated security analysis. In the scope of this paper,
we briefly introduce the process required to understand
how our proposed modelling language and analysis tech-
niques are applied in order to capture and analyse secu-
rity requirements for cloud computing environments.
An outline of the process is illustrated in Fig. 1, show-
ing the four activities involved from the initial require-
ments elicitation and the input and output of the pro-
cess. Activity 1 in the process captures the information
of traditional software systems and applies our domain-
specific knowledge in cloud security using the propose
modelling language. Activity 2 centres around identify-
ing and describing cloud services, stakeholders and as-
sets in the cloud environment with their security needs.
Activity 3 guides the developer through the process of
capturing the physical, virtual and social concepts and
components involved in the cloud computing environ-
ment. Activity 4 describes how our proposed analysis
techniques help guide the developer in performing se-
curity analysis on the cloud models produced through-
out the previous activities, to ensure models are well-
formed and enrich the system-under-design with addi-
tional knowledge through analysis techniques.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The
cloud meta-model, cloud modelling language and syntax
are defined in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3 we present our cloud se-
curity analysis techniques, building upon the cloud mod-
elling language to provide support for semi-automated
reasoning. We have used a university cloud computing
environment as an example for the development of the
models and the demonstration of the analysis techniques.
In Section 4 we present brief information about a tool
that supports the described language and techniques. A
motivating case study based on our work in the VisiOn
European project is described in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6 we
discuss the related work. Finally we conclude the paper
in Sect. 7, noting the on-going work and contributions.
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Fig. 2 The relationships between the security concepts in
our research.
2 The Secure Cloud Modelling Language
In this section we present our secure cloud modelling lan-
guage in order to define the concepts and relationships
required to model cloud computing systems from a secu-
rity requirements perspective. A simplified fragment of
the cloud meta-model is shown in Fig. 3, illustrating con-
cepts as boxes and relationships as shaded boxes, where
boxes with thick outlines indicate the key cloud com-
puting concepts and relationships proposed in our work.
A more detailed description of the concepts and rela-
tionships of the language and a full version of the cloud
meta-model please refer to [15]. Concepts extended from
the Secure Tropos methodology [16] is shown as boxes
with thin outlines.
In order to analyse the security of cloud systems, we
focus on the concepts of resources and goals which rep-
resent abstractions of the services offered by the cloud
system and the physical and virtual resources required
to achieve these goals. This centres around the relation-
ship of cloud services within the scope of the system,
encapsulating information about the input and output
components. Thus in the event of a security incident
targeting assets in the system, we are able to model and
trace the security consequences. There security analysis
techniques can be performed on the cloud model gen-
erated through our cloud modelling language in order
to explain the security consequences in detail, for ex-
ample determining the impact of a threat in terms of
the value metric associated with targeted assets, outlin-
ing the cost metric associated with implementing secu-
rity measures to mitigate threats or validating the satis-
faction of security properties against user-defined rules.
The security analysis chain shown in Fig. 2 illustrates
the relationship between the security concepts that are
defined in our research. This security analysis chain gov-
erns whether the security concepts presented in a cloud
model is well-formed, that is, the security associations
and values are valid according to the cloud modelling
language presented in this paper. We now present our
novel cloud computing concepts.
2.1 Proposed Cloud Computing Concepts
In this subsection we introduce our concepts for mod-
elling cloud computing systems, in the context of se-
curity requirements engineering. To keep the paper to
reasonable length, we present a simplified fragment of
the metamodel, shown in Fig. 3, focusing on the main
cloud computing concepts. For a detailed representation
of the meta-model, including ”focused” metamodels for
each concept, please refer to [15]. Later on in Sect. 5 we
demonstrate how our concepts are applied from a prac-
titioners perspective in the context of a case study.
Cloud Service Goal: A cloud service goal provides
a specific computing capability, is managed and owned
by actors and requires virtual and physical resources in
order to deliver its capability. The cloud service goal con-
cept is a specialisation of the goal concept found in the
Secure Tropos methodology [16], which represents a way
to achieve a specific need. We define a cloud service goal
to embody a way of achieving a specific stakeholder need,
through cloud computing capabilities. The Cloud Ser-
vice Goal concept has the properties Capability, Security
Property, Deployment Model and Service Model, indi-
cating the specific computing capability, security prop-
erty, cloud service deployment model and the service
model. within the context of security. The Deployment
Model determines specific threats and vulnerabilities af-
fecting public, private, hybrid or community models and
the Service Model determines cloud-specific threats and
vulnerabilities impacting different levels such as Infras-
tructure as a Service(IaaS), Platform as a Service(PaaS)
and Software as a Service(SaaS).
Virtual Resource: A virtual resource represents in-
tangible assets in a cloud computing system. In order to
differentiate between tangible and intangible resources,
we create a specialisation of the resource concept to rep-
resent intangible resources as virtual resources which can
be of Type Data or Software to determine jurisdictional
properties. An example of an intangible resource is stu-
dent grades of type data, which has the group visibility
limiting access to actors within the defined group.
The Virtual Resource concept has the properties Type
and Visibility. The Type property denotes the type of re-
source using the enumeration ResourceType, with values;
Data and Software. The Visibility property denotes the
level of visibility of a resource, using the enumeration
Visibility with values; Public, Private and Group.
Physical Infrastructure: A physical infrastructure
represents a tangible system which, given a geographi-
cal location, hosts a group of physical assets within its
local proximity. We define this concept as a specialisa-
tion of the resource concept, given that cloud computing
resources are hosted in physical infrastructure such as
a data-centre. This is essential as properties belonging
to the physical infrastructure contain fields such as ge-
ographical location, ownership and responsible parties;
which is required for performing security analysis within
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Fig. 3 A simplified fragment of the proposed meta-model showing cloud computing concepts.
a jurisdiction such as the EU General Data Protection
Regulation. A physical infrastructure concept has zero
or more infrastructure nodes, which conceptually repre-
sents the grouping of physical computational resources
within an infrastructure.
The Physical Infrastructure concept has the prop-
erties Jurisdiction. The Location property denotes one
or more jurisdictional constraints on the physical infras-
tructure using values defined in the enumeration Juris-
dictionType, for example the value General Data Protec-
tion Regulation.
Infrastructure Node: An infrastructure node rep-
resents a single instance of a computing component such
as a server, data storage or network connection. A tangi-
ble resource is defined as a specialisation of the resource
concept. The NodeID provides an unique identifier for
each instance, which can be a type of compute, network
or storage resource. We define the tenancy as single or
multi-tenant, in order to determine cloud-specific threats
such as hypervisor weakness leading to side-channel at-
tacks between virtual machine instances [13].
The Infrastructure Node concept has the properties
Type and Tenancy. The Type property denotes the type
of infrastructure node, which is defined through the enu-
meration NodeType using the values Compute, Network
and Storage. The Tenancy property denotes the tenancy
of the infrastructure node, which is enumerated through
Tenancy with the values Single and Multiple. The ten-
ancy indicates whether an infrastructure node only in-
volves a single unique user or if multiple users are in-
volved.
The NodeID provides an unique identifier for each
instance of an infrastructure node in a cloud model. The
enumeration JurisdictionType consists of the following
items: US, UK, EU and Asia. This represents which ju-
risdiction the asset falls under, and therefore has to ad-
here to. The enumeration Tenancy indicates whether a
process is limited to a single tenant or if one or more
users are involved.
Permeates: This indicates the relationship which
interrelates data-in-transit and data-at-rest from the vir-
tual resource concept to the infrastructure node and phys-
ical infrastructure, and from the infrastructure node to
another instance of the infrastructure node or a physical
infrastructure. A virtual resource is said to be traceable
to an infrastructure node if the physical component hosts
the virtual resource. For example when a cloud service
processes user data stored on a physical hard drive, the
data is traceable to the hard drive from a computation
node.
A virtual resource is also traceable to a physical in-
frastructure given the traceable link to an infrastructure
node that is part of the physical infrastructure. An in-
frastructure node can also be traceable to another in-
frastructure node or physical infrastructure given an ex-
change of information between the instances, for exam-
ple a computation node requesting and processing data
on a storage node.
Owns: Owns indicates an actors level of responsi-
bility as a relationship where the initiating actor possess
ownership over a physical asset, is the creator of a vir-
tual asset or has data ownership over a virtual asset. For
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example in cases where a cloud users data is physically
stored on assets owned by third party providers, who are
responsible in meeting the security needs of the data.
This relationship is used to depict the level of re-
sponsibility an actor posses in relation to a cloud service
goal goal or resource. It is important to define the dif-
ference between the data creator, data ownership and
physical ownership. The data creator refers to the case
where an actor produces data, and thus is the creator of
the data in the legal sense. Data ownership refers to the
case where data is physically stored on assets owned by
third party providers, therefore the third party providers
are responsible for the handling of the data. Physical
ownership refers to the case where an actor is the owner
of a physical asset, such as a server or data-centre.
The Owns relationship has the property Responsi-
bility, which indicates the type of ownership an actor
possess in relation to a cloud service goal or a resource
and its specialisations. The enumeration Ownership con-
tains the following values; data creator, data ownership
and physical ownership.
An actor can initiate zero or more Owns relation-
ships to a cloud service goal, resource or their special-
isation. A cloud service goal, resource or their speciali-
sation can be the target of zero or Owns relationships
initiated from an actor. The data creator represents an
actor that generates virtual resources, for example per-
sonal information created by a patient. The data own-
ership represents an actor in possession of virtual re-
sources, for example a hospital is responsible for their
patients medical records. The physical ownership repre-
sents actors who are responsible for processing resources
through their own physical infrastructure, for example a
cloud service provider has physical ownership over cus-
tomer data stored on the cloud service providers physical
infrastructure.
Manages: Manages indicates an actors level of re-
sponsibility as a relationship, in the configuration and
delivery of a cloud service goal. Actors managing cloud
services inherit the responsibility for meeting the secu-
rity needs of resources required from the cloud service
and its dependencies. An actor can have zero or more
Manages relationships, indicating that some actors are
not involved in the management of cloud services. A
cloud service can be the target of one or more Manages
relationships from a range of actors, indicating that a
cloud service goal is managed by one or more actors.
The Manages concept has the properties cloud ser-
vice goal, Deployment Model, Service Model and Man-
ager, indicating the instance of the cloud service goal
managed by the actor, the deployment model and ser-
vice model the actor is responsible for and the instance
of the actor initiating the relationship. The cloud service
goal property holds an instance of the cloud service goal
concept, representing the target of the manage relation-
ship. The Deployment Model property specifies which
type of cloud deployment model is managed, where the
enumeration DeploymentModel includes the values Pub-
lic, Private, Hybrid and Community. The Service Model
property specifies which level of the service model an
actor manages, where the enumeration ServiceModel in-
cludes the values SaaS, PaaS, IaaS and XaaS. The Man-
ager property holds an instance of the Actor concept,
representing the actor managing the cloud service goal.
2.2 Extended Concepts and relationships
In this subsection we outline the extensions to exist-
ing concepts in the Secure Tropos methodology, bridging
concepts from cloud computing to the security require-
ments engineering domain. These extensions include def-
inition properties to existing concepts, allowing the lan-
guage to express richer levels of information.
Several concepts have an associated Security prop-
erty, which for the security constraint, security mecha-
nism and security objective concepts, describes specific
security needs such as confidentiality, integrity or avail-
ability on the concept. In the case of threats and vul-
nerabilities, this represents the impact of a breach in
security, for example a threat with the integrity security
property indicates an impact on the integrity of targeted
concepts.
Cloud Actor: The cloud actor concept has two prop-
erties; DeploymentModel representing deployment model
and CloudActorType representing the cloud actor role.
NIST defines five types of cloud actors; Cloud Service
Provider, Cloud Consumer, Cloud Broker, Cloud Car-
rier and Cloud Auditor [7]. The type of cloud actor de-
termines the set of responsibilities and also constrains
the validity of relationships with other concepts. For ex-
ample a cloud consumer who isn’t also a CSP cannot
provide physical infrastructure to another CSP actor.
Requires: A goal, cloud service goal or resource re-
quires a cloud service goal or resource, in order to satisfy
a stakeholder need, fulfil a capability or collaborate with
other resources or cloud service goals. This relationship
indicates the resource or cloud service goal instances re-
quired by a goal, cloud service goal or resource. The Fil-
ter Security Property property can whitelist or blacklist
specific security needs as security properties on associ-
ated concepts.
Impacts: A goal, cloud service goal or resource is
impacted by a threat, which threaten their security prop-
erties. This relationship indicates a resource or cloud ser-
vice is impacted by a specific instance of a threat, where
a Impact Metric denotes the security consequences of
a breach as a qualitative or quantitative value and the
Probability indicates the likelihood of a threat impacting
the concept.
Exploits: A threat is able to exploit a vulnerability.
This relationship indicates that the specific instance of
a threat exploits one or more vulnerabilities.
The Preventable property denotes if the relationship
of an instance of a threat exploiting a vulnerability is
6 Haralambos Mouratidis et al.
preventable. This allows the analysis to determine if mit-
igation strategies exist.
2.3 Syntax
In this subsection we present the instance and concrete
syntax of the cloud modelling language. We define the
machine-readable syntax as machine-readable encoding
of instantiated concepts, relationships and properties from
our cloud meta-model. We define the concrete syntax as
graphical representations of concepts, properties and re-
lationships in our meta-model, which provides a unique
one-to-one mapping of a concept from the metamodel to
an graphical representation in a cloud model.
The purpose of the machine-readable syntax is to
provide a formal and condensed representation of con-
cept instances, which is machine readable in order to
perform analysis on cloud models. Thus the machine-
readable syntax allows the unambiguous encoding of con-
cepts in a textual format, which describes the instanti-
ated concepts from a cloud model to facilitate security
analysis. The general structure of the machine-readable
syntax is as follows: an instance of a concept is de-
fined with a lower case abbreviation with parenthesis
surrounding the properties and relationships of the in-
stance, the properties and relationships of the instance is
defined with upper case abbreviations inside the paren-
thesis.
The concrete syntax is visualised using graphical no-
tation, where each concept in the modelling language is
mapped to an unique graphical notation. The shapes of
the graphical notation was chosen arbitrarily in order
to distinguish between Secure Tropos notation and our
novel cloud computing concepts.
We now describe the syntax of the modelling lan-
guage using the following format: concept, machine-readable
syntax, description and concrete syntax.
Cloud Service Goal: The machine-readable syn-
tax of a cloud service goal is cs(D,CAP,DM,SM). The
machine-readable syntax for a cloud service goal describes
the following: cs() describes an instance of a cloud ser-
vice goal with associated concepts encapsulated inside
the parenthesis, D provides a description of the cloud
service goal, CAP describes the capability of the cloud
service goal, DM is the deployment model and SM is
the service model.
Cloud Actor: The machine-readable syntax of a
cloud actor is ca(D,[T]). The machine-readable syntax
for a cloud service goal provider describes the following:
D is a description of the cloud service provider, [T] is
a list denoting one or more roles played by a cloud ac-
tor. The type of role played by a cloud actor is selected
from the enumeration CloudActorType with the follow-
ing list of roles; Cloud Service provider(csp), Cloud Con-
sumer(cu), Cloud Broker(cb), Cloud Carrier(cc), and
Cloud Auditor(ca). For example a cloud service provider
with the description hospital is encoded as ca(hospital,[csp]).
In case of cloud actors playing multiple roles, for exam-
ple dropbox who is a cloud service provider and also a
cloud consumer is encoded as ca(dropbox,[csp,cu]).
Virtual Resource: The machine-readable syntax of
a virtual resource is vr(D,RT,V). The machine-readable
syntax for a virtual resource describes the following: D
is the description of the virtual resource instance, RT
is the type of resource such as data or software, V is
the type of visibility such as public, private or group.
For example the virtual resource Patient data with the
resource type data and visibility type private is encoded
as vr(data,private).
Physical Infrastructure: The machine-readable syn-
tax of a physical infrastructure is pi(D,L).
The machine-readable syntax for a physical infras-
tructure describes the following: D is the description of
the physical infrastructure, L is an enumerated list of ju-
risdictions which the physical infrastructure falls under.
For example the physical infrastructure hospital infor-
mation system with the jurisdiction General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR) is encoded as pi(hospital is,gdpr).
Infrastructure Node: The machine-readable syn-
tax of a cloud service goal is in(D,NT,TE).
The machine-readable syntax for an infrastructure
node describes the following: D is the description of the
infrastructure node, NT determines the type of the in-
frastructure node such as network or storage, TE deter-
mines the type of tenancy as single or multi-tenant. For
example the infrastructure node amazon server 1 with
the compute node type and single tenancy is encoded as
in(amazon server1,compute,single).
3 Cloud Analysis Techniques
In this section we define security analysis techniques to
support the developer through the process of identify-
ing threats and vulnerabilities in a cloud environment,
proposing alternative mitigation measures and validat-
ing cloud security needs. For example the threat analysis
identifies threats on cloud assets, where the developer
can determine the impact of a threat in terms of the
value metric associated with targeted assets. Following
the security mitigation analysis, the developer is able to
determine the cost metric associated with implementing
security measures such as security mechanisms to mit-
igate threats or validating the satisfaction of security
properties against user-defined rules. In order to sup-
port developers with expert knowledge of security issues
and vulnerabilities, we consult the vulnerability feeds
from the National Vulnerabilities Database(NVD), an
U.S. government repository of standards-based vulnera-
bility management data [21]. It is also worth mentioning
that the analysis techniques are implemented through
the framework’s tool, which is described briefly in Sec-
tion 4.
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Figure 4 illustrates the three supported cloud anal-
ysis; 1.) cloud security analysis, 2.) security mitigation
analysis, and 3.) transparency analysis, where the analy-
sis technique of each analysis are labelled 1a., 1b. respec-
tively i.e. vulnerability analysis and threat analysis are
both cloud security analysis techniques. The input and
output of each analysis technique indicates which sub-
set of the cloud environment model(CEM ) is used as
input and updated respectively. The CEM is used as in-
put for the analysis techniques, where the CEM consists
of the cloud system mapped using the machine-readable
syntax during the modelling process. The order of the
analysis is interchangeable depending on the developer
needs and richness of the cloud environment model. For
example the developer can perform the security mitiga-
tion analysis on a cloud environment model which has al-
ready identified pre-existing threats and vulnerabilities.
On the other hand a cloud environment model with an
empty resource knowledge base i.e. no resources in the
system, will not produce any vulnerabilities or threats
because there are no resources to impact or affect.
We now summarise the three types of cloud anal-
ysis, where the analysis techniques of each analysis is
discussed in reference to Fig. 4:
– Cloud Security Analysis 1a. Vulnerability anal-
ysis: We identify vulnerabilities affecting resources
in the system-under-design, represented through the
cloud environment model(CEM ), by consulting the
resource knowledge base(RKB). We refine the CEM
by enumerating specific vulnerabilities which affects
resources in the system, updating the cloud threat
model(CVM ). Thus the CVM contains information
on which resources are exploitable and the specific
vulnerabilities affecting the system-under-design.
– Cloud Security Analysis 1b. Threat analysis:
We identify threats which exploit vulnerabilities in
the system. According to the vulnerabilities exploited,
we refine the CEM to enumerate in the cloud threat
model(CTM ), which goals or resources are impacted
by specific threats. Thus the CTM provides informa-
tion on which resources or goals are at risk as a result
of vulnerabilities identified in the CVM, and the spe-
cific threat exploiting the associated vulnerabilities
which impacts the security properties of resources of
goals in the system. The actor model(AM ) identifies
any malicious actors posing a threat on the system.
– Security Mitigation Analysis 2a Security con-
straint resolution: We identify security constraints
by consulting the organisation relationships(OR), given
an AM, in order to mitigate threats in the system.
The purpose of a security constraint is to address the
specific security property compromised by threats
identified in the CVM. We consult the CEM and
update the AM to show security constraints placed
on the system as a result of identified threats. Thus
the AM provides information on what security con-
straints or security needs need to be satisfied, in order
to mitigate threats on the system-under-design.
– Security Mitigation Analysis 2b. Security ob-
jective resolution: We identify security objectives
by consulting the CTM, in order to determine if all
the security constraints placed on the system are
satisfied. We refine the CEM to enumerate in the
CTM security objectives and which security prop-
erties they satisfy in relation to security constraints
found in the AM. Thus the CTM advises the devel-
oper of the specific security objectives which should
be implemented, in order to address the security con-
straints placed on the system-under-design.
– Security Mitigation Analysis 2c. Security mech-
anism resolution: We identify security mechanisms
by consulting the CVM in order to protect against
the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the system-under-
design. Security mechanisms are implemented through
security objectives, thus the CEM is refined through
the CVM and CTM to enumerate how vulnerabili-
ties are addressed by security mechanisms and which
security objectives implements the defined counter-
measures respectively.
– Transparency Analysis 3a. Cloud Security Man-
agement This analysis identifies the roles of cloud
actors responsible for the management or ownership
of physical and virtual assets, by consulting the AM
and cross-referencing the organisational relationships
(OR) with resources and goals found in the RKB.
The identified relationships enumerating these roles
are reflected in the OR and updates the CEM with
any modifications made. The cloud actors responsible
for managing and implementing security measures
are also identified by consulting the CVM, CTM and
AM. This analysis allows developers to summarise
the delegation of responsibilities in order to ensure
the cloud security requirements of the system is sat-
isfied, updating the CTM and CSM.
The following subsections describes the steps of each
stage in further detail, providing a systematic process to
carry out cloud security analysis. Note that the notation
of the process is described using the machine-readable
syntax defined earlier in Section 2.3, where capital let-
ters in italic indicates variables holding values i.e. X,Y,
and the equals sign is the assignment operator i.e. X=Y
assigns the value in the variable Y to X. To support
readers we have used a running example based on a uni-
versity cloud computing environment focusing on the ca-
reer office services that a university provides, building on
our own understanding of such services.
3.1 Cloud Security Analysis
The first analysis takes as input a cloud model with
the minimal concepts consisting of goals, actors and re-
sources as shown in Figure 5. Goals are required in order
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Fig. 4 Process illustrating three types of cloud analysis with inputs from and updates to the cloud environment model.
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Fig. 5 A cloud model generated through the running example, which is provided as input for the analysis.
to capture the needs of the system. In addition cloud ser-
vice goals are a specialisation of the goal concept, in or-
der to describe the cloud computing needs of the system
and stakeholders. Resources describe the components
the system and processes require in order to fulfil their
needs, which includes the cloud computing specialisa-
tions; virtual resource representing intangible resources,
infrastructure node representing tangible resources and
physical infrastructure representing boundary-specific com-
ponents in the system. This analysis consists of two tech-
niques; the vulnerability analysis and threat analysis.
In order to map security knowledge to our cloud mod-
els, vulnerability, threat and mitigation information is
extracted from the NVD CVE XML 2.0 schema. We de-
fine NVD as a set and say that a quadruple (cvename,
product, vendor, version) is in NVD if a NVD entry de-
scribes cvename in the entry element with name as the
attribute, product in the prod element with product as
the name attribute, vendor as the vendor attribute and
version in the vers element with version as the num
attribute.
3.1.1 Vulnerability Analysis Given a cloud environment
model CEM, the vulnerability analysis examines the RKB
of the CEM and searches the properties of assets within
RKB. Specifically this analysis examines the properties
of the set virtual resources VR, the set physical infras-
tructure PI, the set infrastructure node IN and their
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Fig. 6 A new vulnerability is identified and generated from the vulnerability analysis.
relationships VPIR in the RKB. Vulnerabilities are iden-
tified based on security knowledge and the CVM is up-
dated. The following definition describes the procedure
in order to perform the vulnerability analysis, where the
NVD is used to identify and generate vulnerabilities af-
fecting assets in a cloud model:
Definition: Vulnerability analysis For each (prod-
uct, version, vendor) in a virtual resource, physical in-
frastructure or infrastructure node of RKB if (product,
version, vendor) is in NVD then update the CVM with a
new instance of the vulnerability concept with the affects
relationship to the virtual resource, physical infrastruc-
ture or infrastructure node. The new vulnerability in-
stance has the description cvename where cvename is
the matching NVD entry given the quadruple (cvename,
product, vendor, version).
For example given the cloud environment model shown
in Figure 5, there are five entities in the RKB of the
CEM ; VR1 Student response, VM 1 Instance HP, CSP
instance, CSP Datacentre and OS 1 Windows. The CVM
has one existing vulnerability entry, enumerated as:
CVM(VM 1 Instance HP,Hypervisor weakness,
affects(VM 1 Instance HP,Hypervisor weakness)). When
performing the vulnerability analysis, the properties in
VR1 Student response, VM 1 Instance HP, CSP instance
and CSP Datacentre do not match any entries in NVD.
However the virtual resource OS 1 Windows, which is
enumerated as OS 1 Windows(Windows,Microsoft,
Windows 10), matches an entry in the NVD represented
as a quadruple (CVE-2016-0181,Windows,Microsoft,
Windows 10). Therefore a new instance of the vulnera-
bility concept was added to the CVM with the descrip-
tion CVE-2016-0181 and the relationship affects(CVE-
2016-0181,OS 1 Windows). Figure 6 illustrates the new
vulnerability in the cloud model, after performing the
vulnerability analysis. The CVM is now enumerated as:
CVM((VM 1 Instance HP,OS 1 Windows),(Hypervisor
weakness,CVE-2016-0181),(affects(VM 1 Instance HP,
Hypervisor weakness),affects(CVE-2016-0181,OS 1 Win-
dows)))
3.1.2 Threat Analysis The threat analysis is the sec-
ond analysis technique in the cloud security analysis,
taking as input a CEM. Given a set of vulnerabilities in
the CVM, these vulnerabilities can be exploited through
threats posed by malicious actors in the AM to com-
promise the confidentiality, integrity or availability of
resources and processes in the system. Therefore this
analysis examines the CVM for vulnerabilities and ex-
isting threats in the CTM, generating new threats in
the CTM to indicate the type of security property each
threat impacts.
Definition: Threat analysis For each instance of a
vulnerability V in the CVM of the CEM with the rela-
tionship affects(V,R) or affects(V,G), if the description
of V is in NVD then create a new instance of a threat
T in the CTM with the following two properties; (i)
the description “Impact on (C,I,A)” where (C,I,A) is a
triple containing values from the corresponding NVD en-
try with CVSS vector in the entry element and C,I,A as
the attributes, (ii) the security property (C,I,A) where
(C,I,A) is a triple containing values from the NVD entry
with CVSS vector in the entry element and C,I,A as the
attributes.
The new instance of the threat T has the following
relationships; (i) the exploits relationship to the corre-
sponding vulnerability as exploits(T,V), (ii) the impacts
relationship to the resource R or goal G as impacts(T,R)
or impacts(T,G).
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System(CVSS) is
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a free and open industry standard for quantifying the
severity of security vulnerabilities. The CVSS defines the
impact of an exploit on a system using three security
properties: “The confidentiality (C) metric describes the
impact on the confidentiality of data processed by the
system.”, “The Integrity (I) metric describes the impact
on the integrity of the exploited system.” and “The avail-
ability (A) metric describes the impact on the availabil-
ity of the target system. Attacks that consume network
bandwidth, processor cycles, memory or any other re-
sources affect the availability of a system.”. The current
version of CVSS (CVSS v3.0) was released in June 2015.
Therefore we align the impact of exploiting a vul-
nerability in CVSS as the impact of a threat on a re-
source and the exploitation of a vulnerability in our
cloud modelling language. Specifically we take the three
security properties defined in CVSS; confidentiality, in-
tegrity and availability to correspond to values defining
security needs in the security property of our threat con-
cept. That is we map on an one-to-one basis given the
exploitation of a vulnerability in CVSS, the impact on
one or more of the three security properties corresponds
to a threat enumerating these security properties.
For example Figure 7 illustrates the exploits rela-
tionship of a threat on a vulnerability, where the threat
also impacts a resource. In this example the vulnera-
bility entry with the CVE identifier CVE-2016-0181 is
found in the NVD vulnerability data feed, where the
following CVSS information is extracted for that entry;
< entry CV SS vector = ”(C : N/I : P/A : N) >. This
extract from the CVSS indicates that there is no impact
on the confidentiality property of resources affected by
the vulnerability if exploited, partial impact on the in-
tegrity property of associated resources and no impact
on the availability property. Therefore the threat with
the name “Impact on integrity” with the set of security
property [I : P ] is generated in the model, indicating the
threat of partially impacting integrity if the associated
vulnerability is exploited.
3.2 Security Mitigation Analysis
The second type of analysis supported is the security
mitigation analysis, where the purpose is to examine
threats and vulnerabilities from the CVM and CTM
in order to propose potential approaches for mitigation.
This analysis takes a CEM as input, given that there ex-
ists vulnerabilities in the CVM and threats in the CTM.
3.2.1 Security Constraint Resolution Security constraints
represent the security needs of the system on assets or
processes, where a security constraint needs to be satis-
fied in order to mitigate a threat. A security constraint
mitigates a threat, indicated by the mitigates(SC,T) re-
lationship in the CTM. A security constraint SC re-
stricts a resource R and its specialisations or a goal
G and the cloud service goal specialisation, indicated
through the relationship restrictsresource(SC,R,A) and
restrictsggoal(SC,G,A) in the OR. We define this tech-
nique to identify security constraints, create the miti-
gates relationship from a security constraint to a threat
T and create the restricts relationship from a security
constraint to a resource R or goal G. In the scope of
this technique, R and G refers to the entry in the im-
pacts(T,R) or impacts(T,G) relationships of the CTM.
Therefore this analysis identifies the security needs of the
system through security constraints, in order to address
threats impacting resources and goals.
Definition: Security constraint resolution For
each threat T in the CTM of the CEM where miti-
gates(SC,T) does not exist, then create an entry mit-
igates(SC,T) in the CTM where SC has the follow-
ing properties; (i) the description “Protect (C,I,A) of
(R—G)” where (C,I,A) is a triple in the security prop-
erty of T and R—G is a single in the description of R
or G, (ii) the security property (C,I,A) where (C,I,A) is
a triple in the security property of T.
For each impacts(T,R) or impacts(T,G) in the CTM
where there does not already exist a restricts(SC,R) or
restricts(SC,G), create the following relationship with
the security constraint SC ; (i) restricts(SC,R) or re-
stricts(SC,G) where R or G corresponds to the entry
found in the impacts(T,R) or impacts(T,G) relationships
of the CTM.
For example Figure 8 shows a security constraint cre-
ated in order to mitigate a threat, while restricting a
resource. Following the threat analysis, we identify the
threat named Impact on integrity in the cloud model,
with the security property containing the set of values
I. Taking the name of the threat as Impact on integrity,
the target of the impacts relationship from the threat
is identified as OS 1 Windows, which is assigned to A.
The security constraint with the name Protect integrity
is created, with the security property I. A mitigates rela-
tionship from the security constraint Protect integrity to
the threat Impact on integrity is then created. Finally a
restricts relationship from the security constraint Protect
integrity to the resource OS 1 Windows is created.
After performing this analysis we have created a se-
curity constraint with the security property I, which has
the mitigates relationship to the threat Impact on in-
tegrity and the restricts relationship to the resource OS
1 Windows. This security constraint therefore represents
the security need which has to be satisfied to mitigate the
indicated threat, where the security need is the security
property integrity. The restricts relationship from the
security constraint to the resource tells us which compo-
nent in the system has security needs, specifically it tells
us which security property needs to be satisfied.
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Fig. 7 Identifying a threat exploiting a vulnerability and impacting a resource.
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Fig. 8 Creating a security constraint which mitigates a threat and restricts a resource.
3.3 Security Objective Resolution
The second part of the security mitigation analysis takes
as input the CTM, AM and RKB. The purpose of this
analysis is to cross-reference CVE and CWE entries be-
tween the NVD vulnerability data feed in the NVD and
the CWE database, in order to identify and create secu-
rity objective entries in the CTM. Therefore in this tech-
nique security objectives are identified to satisfy secu-
rity constraints through the satisfies relationship, where
properties of the security objectives are extracted from
entries in the NVD and CWE.
Definition: Security objective resolution For each
security constraint SC in the CTM of the CEM where
satisfies(SO,SC) does not exist, then create an entry sat-
isfies(SO,SC) in the CTM where the security objective
SO has the following properties; (i) the description (M)
where (M) is a single that exists in the CWE core con-
tent database with the Mitigation Strategy element and
M attribute corresponding to the CWE entry, (ii) the
security property (C,I,A) where (C,I,A) is a triple that
exists in the CWE core content database which describes
(C,I,A) in the Consequence Scope attribute of the Com-
mon Consequence element given a corresponding CWE
entry.
Figure 9 shows the identification of a security objec-
tive as a result of consulting the CVE during the security
objective resolution. In this case the security objective
has the securityProperty of value I and the relationship
satisfies(MIT-5.1 Input validation,Protect integrity of
hypervsior), which corresponds to the securityProperty I
in Protect integrity of hypervsior.
3.4 Security Mechanism Resolution
The final stage of the security mitigation analysis as in-
put the CVM, CTM, AM and RKB from the CEM. The
purpose of this technique is to identify the security mech-
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Fig. 9 Creating a security objective which satisfies a security constraint.
anisms required to address vulnerabilities in the system-
under-design. Specifically the CVE entry of vulnerabil-
ities are cross-referenced through the NVD and CWE,
where matching entries specify the mitigation method
through the protects(SM,V) relationship.
Definition: Security mechanism resolution For
each vulnerability V in the CVM of the CEM where
protects(SM,V) does not exist, then create an entry pro-
tects(SM,V) in the CVM where the security mechanism
SM has the following properties; (i) the description (M)
where (M) is a single that exists in the CWE core con-
tent database with the Mitigation Description element
and M attribute corresponding to the CWE entry, (ii)
the security property (C,I,A) where (C,I,A) is a triple
that exists in the CWE core content database which de-
scribes (C,I,A) in the Consequence Scope attribute of
the Common Consequence element given a correspond-
ing CWE entry.
For each protects(SM,V) in the CTM where there
does not exist an implements(SO,SM) relationship, cre-
ate the following relationships with the security objective
SO ; (i) an implements(SO,SM) where the responsibility
property of implements is the actor A.
Figure 10 shows a security mechanism which im-
plements a security objective. In this case the security
mechanism indicates how the security objective can be
implemented, not the technical implementation instance
or method. This limitation is due to the level of infor-
mation provided in the security sources selected in our
security analysis process. We argue that in the scope of
security requirements engineering, providing exact tech-
nical implementation details during the early require-
ments stage is difficult due to the abstraction of com-
ponents and concepts. That is during the design of the
system-to-be, the developer does not posses enough in-
formation to be able to provide or make use of precise
technical implementation level details.
3.5 Transparency Analysis
The analysis techniques defined previously have dealt
with identifying security issues and solutions in a cloud
computing environment, based on the properties of con-
cepts such as cloud service goals and resources in the
CEM. In order for developers to understand how cloud
computing characteristics impacts the security needs in
a cloud computing system, the responsibilities of cloud
actors should be made clear. In this case there are several
factors which determine a cloud actors scope of security
responsibilities in a cloud computing environment. The
primary concern is to determine the ownership and man-
agement of processes, data and infrastructure in a cloud
computing system. Therefore by associating cloud actors
with concepts in the system-under-design, the tractabil-
ity of security responsibilities can be determined. As an
example, given a cloud service goal with the SaaS cloud
service model, the cloud service provider will be respon-
sible for managing the infrastructure and applications re-
quired by the cloud service. Therefore the security impli-
cations in this example is that the cloud service provider
will be responsible for addressing any security challenges
that impact the infrastructure and applications associ-
ated with the cloud service.
3.5.1 Cloud Security Management The purpose of this
analysis is to examine the security needs of a cloud com-
puting system, in order to identify cloud actors responsi-
ble for satisfying these security needs. The analysis takes
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Fig. 10 Creating a security mechanism which implements a security objective and protects a vulnerability.
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Fig. 11 Cloud environment model showing the security needs of a system-under-design.
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as input the CVM, CTM, OR, RKB and CSM. Specifi-
cally the analysis examines the affects, exploits, impacts
and restricts relationships in the CVM, CTM and OR to
determine the security challenges imposed on goals and
resources. The protects, satisfies, implements and mit-
igates relationships in the CVM and CTM determine
how to address security challenges in the system-under-
design. The owns, manages and poses relationships in
the AM indicates the association between cloud actors
and the processes, data and infrastructure in the cloud
computing environment.
Definition: Cloud security management For each
security constraint SC of CEM, if SC is in OR where
restrictsresource(SC,R,A) or restrictsgoal(SC,G,A) and
requiresgoal(G,R) exists then each SC has the following
values appended to its SecurityRequirement property:
– append “The cloud actor A is responsible for SC
on G R: ” where the properties of A, SC, G and
R is in the restrictsresource(SC,R,A) or restricts-
goal(SC,G,A) of OR
– for each affects(V,R), affects(V,G) and protects(SM,V)
in CVM where R or G is the same scope of SC then
append “Security mechanism SM to protect against
vulnerability V ”
– for each exploits(T,V) and mitigates(SC,T) in CTM
where T and SC is in the same scope of SC then
append “Security constraint SC mitigates the threat
T ”
– for each satisfies(SO,SC) and implements(SO,SM) in
the CTM where SC and SM is in the same scope of
SC then append “Security objective SO satisfies se-
curity constraint SC and implements security mech-
anism SM”
Figure 11 illustrates a cloud environment model con-
sisting of the following concepts: cloud actor Career of-
fice admin and CSP1, cloud service goal Survey man-
agement, virtual resource Student response, infrastruc-
ture node Hypervisor, physical infrastructure CSP Dat-
acentre, vulnerability CVE-2016-0181, threat Impact on
confidentiality, security constraint Ensure confidential-
ity, security objective Separation of Privilege and se-
curity mechanism MIT-48. These concepts are formally
represented in
CEM = 〈RKB,AM,OR,CSM,CVM,CTM〉
where relationships such as restrictsresource(Ensure con-
fidentiality,Hypervisor,CSP1) in the OR, protects(MIT-
48,CVE-2016-0181) in the CVM and satisfies(Separation
of Privilege,Ensure confidentiality) in the CTM are de-
scribed. These relationships are examined when perform-
ing the cloud security management analysis, describing
the security needs of the system. After performing this
analysis, the security constraint Ensure confidentiality
in CEM has the following securityRequirement property
representing the security responsibility of a cloud actor:
“The cloud actor CSP1 is responsible for Ensure confi-
dentiality on Hypervisor: Security mechanism MIT-48
to protect against vulnerability CVE-2016-0181, Secu-
rity constraint Ensure confidentiality mitigates the threat
Impact on confidentiality, Security objective Separation
of Privilege satisfies security constraint Ensure confiden-
tiality and implements security mechanism MIT-48”.
In summary, after performing the analysis techniques in
the security analysis process, a security-enhanced cloud
model is produced by semi-automatically enriching the
model with security concepts such as vulnerabilities, threats,
security constraints, security objectives and security mech-
anisms. Specially the security constraints tells us which
resources and goals in the system is impacted by threats
or affected by vulnerabilities, and how they are restricted
in terms of the security properties that need to be pro-
tected. The security objectives provide high level de-
scriptions of what needs to be done in order to satisfy
the security properties outlined in security constraints.
The security mechanisms describe at a lower level, the
method or technique which need to be carried out in
order to implement security objectives.
While the granularity of the proposed concepts and
mitigation strategy do not provide a direct way for de-
velopers to proceed to the implementation stage through
coding guidelines, we argue that this is a limitation given
the level of information provided from the security sources.
Rather our security analysis approach guides the devel-
oper of cloud systems in analysing the goals and re-
sources of a system, drawing from industry standard se-
curity sources to create and illustrate the relationships
and concepts to help developers understand the security
needs of the system-under-design.
4 Tool Support
Apparatus Software Tool(ASTo) is an open source graph-
ical security analysis tool for Internet of Things(IoT)
networks, providing tool support for the Apparatus se-
curity framework in [19]. In order to provide developers
with semi-automated tool support when applying our
secure cloud environment framework, our contribution
is the SectroCloud module, which extends ASTo with
cloud security requirements concepts. The automated
reasoning support includes a graphical interface improv-
ing quality-of-life through task automation, the means to
create visual models and perform semi-automated secu-
rity analysis. The contributions of the SectroCloud mod-
ule is as follows:
– Visualisation of the concepts and relationships de-
fined by the modelling language.
– Graphical representation of the conceptual cloud en-
vironment model, with three views focusing on the
organisational, application and infrastructure level of
concepts.
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– Provides semi-automated reasoning based on the three
cloud analysis techniques defined in the previous sec-
tion. In particular Cloud Security Analysis, Secu-
rity Miitgation Analysis and Transparency Analysis.
Taking as input models and information from public
databases (as explained in the previous section) the
tool enhances the models created by the user with
relevant threat, vulnerability information.
– Quality-of-life utility and interface usability to sup-
port developers during the modelling process, such
as concept and relationship filters, baseline security
analysis techniques, data overview and model cate-
gorisation.
ASTo with the SectroCloud module is available for
download from the authors online repository 1. The in-
structions for installing the tool are provided in the on-
line repository. One of the main issues in modelling com-
plex systems in a cloud environment is the scalability
and visual presentation of data, when developers need
to model cloud systems with hundreds of nodes and re-
lationships. With tool support, features such as the vi-
sualisation and grouping of concepts within a specific
scope helps developers to uncouple complex models and
understand the workings of the system under design.
5 VisiOn Case Study: Municipality of Athens
In this section we evaluate our modelling language and
analysis techniques using a scenario from the Visual Pri-
vacy Management in User Centric Open Environment
(VisiOn)2 European project case study. VisiOn is an in-
tegrated tool solution that organisations can connect to
part or all of their systems within their infrastructure.
The VisiOn tool is accessed through a web interface by
users such as citizens, allowing them to interact with the
public administration(PA) in order to search for infor-
mation, updates and requirements on the management
of their data. This case study was selected because of
the relevancy between the VisiOn project and the cloud
computing needs of their stakeholders, specifically in sce-
narios where the cloud security requirements of stake-
holders need to be understood as they transition from
traditional systems to a cloud computing environment.
The scenario from this case study was selected from
one of three pilot scenarios proposed by a local Greek
government development company named ”City of Athens
IT Company” (DAEM) for the VisiOn project. In this
scenario an Athenian city resident, George, submits a
request for an annual membership at a public swimming
pool in Athens, with a disability discount. In order to
verify his current residence and medical situation to be
eligible for specific city services, the swimming pool fac-
ulty is responsible for verifying the birth and medical
1 https://github.com/NOMNUDS/apparatus
2 http://www.visionprivacyplatform.eu
certificates of the applicant, in order to approve the citi-
zenship status and medical circumstances for a discount.
The swimming pool administration team will outsource
their computing needs to a third party cloud comput-
ing provider, where the business data and processes of
their system is stored and processed externally in a cloud
computing environment. The municipality of Athens is
responsible for providing copies of various certificates of
citizens, where their data is accessed and stored by certi-
fied governmental cloud computing providers. The clinic
in this scenario stores the medical information and cer-
tificate of citizens on certified health-care cloud comput-
ing infrastructure. Therefore in this scenario the per-
sonal data of citizens is exchanged between the pub-
lic authority from the municipality of Athens, person-
nel at a clinic and the swimming pool administration
staff. This scenario is examined from the perspective of
DAEM, where they are responsible for determining the
cloud security requirements of the stakeholders in this
scenario, and disseminating the identified requirements
to the appropriate parties.
The stakeholders in this case study are the represen-
tatives of the public authority (Municipality of Athens),
swimming pool administrator and Athenian citizens
(George), where their requirements are represented by
DAEM.
The description and security requirements of the stake-
holders in the Municipality of Athens scenario were ob-
tained in the context of the VisiOn project 3. The secu-
rity requirements are as follows:
– SR1 The actor SP Information System require Badge
to authenticate in order to achieve goal Badge issued.
– SR2 The actor SP Information System require un-
linkability on Badge in order to achieve goal Badge
issued.
– SR3 The actor Municipality of Athens shall ensure
the integrity of the required resource Medical certifi-
cate permeating to SP information system is pre-
served.
– SR4 The actor Municipality of Athens shall ensure
the confidentiality of the required resource Medical
certificate permeating to SP information system is
preserved.
– SR5 The actor Municipality of Athens shall ensure
the integrity of the required resource Birth certificate
permeating to SP administrator is preserved.
– SR6 The actor Municipality of Athens shall ensure
the confidentiality of the required resource Birth cer-
tificate permeating to SP administrator is preserved.
– SR7 The actor SP Information System shall ensure
the confidentiality of the required resource Bank de-
tails is preserved.
3 http://www.visioneuproject.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/2015-VSN-RP-053-D2.2-Citizens-
and-Public-Administrations-Privacy-Requirements.pdf
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Fig. 12 Organisational goal model of the VisiOn Municipality of Athens scenario.
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– SR8 The actor SP Information System shall ensure
the integrity of the required resource Bank details is
preserved.
– SR9 The actor Clinic shall ensure the integrity of
the required resource Medical certificate is preserved
when received by actor SP information system.
– SR10 The actor Clinic shall ensure the confidential-
ity of the required resource Medical certificate is pre-
served when received by actor SP information sys-
tem.
Taking these requirements into account, the aim of
this scenario is to realise these requirements in a cloud
computing environment. This is achieved by applying
the secure cloud process illustrated previously in Fig-
ure 1 to refine cloud models and perform security anal-
ysis in order to produce cloud security requirements.
5.1 Outcome from the Application of the Secure Cloud
Process
In this subsection we report on the outcomes of applying
the secure cloud process to the Municipality of Athens
scenario, in order to evaluate our proposed modelling
language and analysis techniques. Here we outline the
outcomes of each activity following the application of
the secure cloud process, focusing on the output in terms
of producing and refining cloud models throughout the
modelling and security analysis activities without detail-
ing each step.
5.1.1 Organisational Goal Model The Municipality of
Athens scenario describes a situation where the primary
goal of an Athenian citizens is a request for an annual
membership for a local swimming pool in Athens, which
is processed by the administration staff. In the process of
determining the validity for a disability discount, the ad-
ministration staff at the swimming pool requests access
to copies of the citizens birth and medical certificates.
This is carried out through communication with pub-
lic administration staff, represented as the actors Mu-
nicipality of Athens and medical personnel at a local
clinic. Figure 12 shows a graphical representation of an
organisational goal model in the Municipality of Athens
scenario, generated using the SectroCloud tool. The or-
ganisational goal model was constructed by the author
based on the information found in stakeholder require-
ments and specification documents available from the
VisiOn European project. The actors in this scenario
are; Athenian citizen George, SP Information System,
Municipality of Athens, SP administrator, Clinic and SP
receptionist. The primary goal of the actor Athenian cit-
izen George in the scenario is Gain access to swimming
pool facility service. This is composed of the sub-goals
Medical certificate issued and Get registered. The model
has six conceptual boundaries corresponding to each ac-
tor, where each bounded area includes the goals and re-
sources of each actor. Several goals depend on the goals
located in cross-boundary areas, denoting the exchange
of data outside the scope of individual organisations or
stakeholders. For example the Municipality of Athens de-
pends on the SP administration to ensure the medical
certificate is confidential during transmission.
5.1.2 Organisational Cloud System Following the cre-
ation of the organisational goal model, this next activ-
ity focuses on the identification and creation of cloud
services, corresponding to the goals of the system and
stakeholders. As this activity is performed from the per-
spective of DAEM, we identify the cloud service goals
required in order to transmit, access and store data to-
wards achieving the primary goal of Gain access to swim-
ming pool facility service by the actor Athenian citizen
George. Thus the following cloud service goals have been
identified so far; SP payment service, Access monitoring
service, Certificate management service, PA banking ser-
vice. The SP administration service represents a cloud
service goal which acts as a gateway to business pro-
cesses essential for the operation of the swimming pool.
The Access monitoring service represents a cloud service
goal which is part of the SP administration service, spe-
cialising in capabilities within the scope of monitoring
membership access. The Certificate management service
represents a cloud service goal for managing the access,
verification and issuing of medical and citizenship certifi-
cates. The PA banking service represents a cloud service
goal used by public administration for banking services,
such as accessing, withdrawing and setting up payments
for bank accounts.
The cloud service filter shown in Figure 13 showcases
how the graphical highlighting of a specific concept helps
developers narrow the scope of a cloud model to cloud
services. Thus given a large model composed of complex
relationships and concepts, developers are able to spot
patterns and manipulate the graphical representation of
the cloud model to further their understanding. This was
useful in this scenario due to the requirements for mod-
elling and visualising the satisfaction of security proper-
ties, such as confidentiality and integrity on components,
which involves understanding visually complex chains of
relationships and properties. We now discuss how the re-
lationships and properties of the cloud services identified
in this activity are refined in the following activity.
5.1.3 Holistic Cloud Model In order to address the ten
security requirements on the cloud system, represented
through security constraints, the framework guides the
developer through the process of devising the mitiga-
tion strategy. Therefore during the organisational mod-
elling step, six security objectives were added to address
the existing security constraints. Nine security mecha-
nisms were proposed to implement all identified security
objectives. Specifically the security constraints Receiver
authentication (SP) and Receiver unlinkability (SP) are
satisfied by the security objectives Ensure authentication
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Fig. 13 View filter highlighting the cloud services in the scenario cloud model.
and Unlinkability, which are implemented by the security
mechanisms Username/password and Pseudonymizer tools
respectively. The security constraints Receiver confiden-
tiality, Receiver confidentiality (Bank), Receiver integrity
and Receiver integrity (Bank) are satisfied by the se-
curity objectives Ensure confidentiality and Ensure in-
tegrity, which are implemented by the security mecha-
nisms Encryption, Host IDS and Network IDS respec-
tively. Finally the last set of security constraints Sender
integrity and Sender confidentiality are satisfied by the
security objectives Ensure confidentiality and Ensure in-
tegrity, and is implemented by the security mechanisms
Encryption and Mirroring respectively. These security
measures have been identified and represent at a high
level, a mitigation strategy for the satisfaction of the
cloud security needs. The holistic cloud model produced
in the VisiOn case study is therefore shown in Figure 14.
5.1.4 Security Analysis Once the relevant model has
been constructed, the next step involves the application
of the security analysis process. It is worth mentioning
that this section does not report on the complete anal-
ysis of the case study but focuses on a specific node to
demonstrate how the automated analysis can be applied
to such case studies.
The properties on the model are used to identify
matching vulnerabilities in expert databases from sources
such as the National Vulnerability Database(NVD). In
this case the properties type “enterprise linux”, ven-
dor “redhat” and version “5” of “SP Software System”
matches the vulnerability “CVE-2011-1576” from the
NVD. The “Vulnerability identification” analysis gener-
ates a vulnerability in the cloud model with the descrip-
tion “CVE-2011-1576” and relationship “affecting” the
“SP Software System” node. In addition according to the
entry data in the NVD, the “CVE-2011-1576” vulnera-
bility is associated to the vulnerability type “CWE-119:
Buffer Errors”, which is generated in the cloud model as
“CWE-119: Buffer Errors” and is composed of the origi-
nally identified vulnerability “CVE-2011-1576”. The “Mal-
ware” threat exploits the “Insecure storage” vulnerabil-
ity affecting the “Hypervisor” infrastructure node.
After identifying the vulnerabilities and creating in-
stances in the cloud model, the next step is to deter-
mine security mechanisms suitable for addressing these
vulnerabilities. As an example of our analysis, the secu-
rity mechanism resolution identifies two security mecha-
nisms; “Patch: RHSA-2011:0927-1” and “Strategy: Lan-
guage Selection”, in order to address the “CVE-2011-
1576” and “CWE-119: Buffer Errors” vulnerabilities re-
spectively. These security mechanisms were identified
and modelled based on the mitigation details described
in the vulnerabilities entries, when referring to the ex-
pert knowledge in the NVD.
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Fig. 14 Visualisation of the holistic cloud model.
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5.1.5 Lessons Learned In this sub-section we discuss
the lessons learned after the application of our work in
the VisiOn case study. During the collaborative work
with the requirement engineers in the application of the
tool, we have observed issues in the scalability of mod-
els and visual presentation. Specifically the model in
question was created from requirements specifying over
eighty nodes, where several nodes had a high concentra-
tion of incoming and outgoing edges. Nodes with multi-
ple edges would partially obscure or overlap with neigh-
bouring nodes and edges, which resulted in models with
sections that were visually difficult to understand. This
issue with visual presentation of highly concentrated mod-
els was exacerbated in the figures produced in this thesis,
primary due to the limitation of presenting readable fig-
ures which still fits within an A4 page. However in the
models created by requirements engineers during the col-
laborative phase, the spacing was more relaxed to allow
for visualising systems with higher complexity and den-
sity. This phenomenon was attributed to the fact that
in a practical work space, the practitioner focuses on
fragments of a system. For example Figure 15 shows a
fragment of the cloud environment model generated for
the VisiOn case study, where the spacing is relaxed. As
such, they are not bound by the limitation of presenting
a visual model which scales down to fit an A4 page.
Therefore from this observation we conclude that
from a practitioners perspective, the process of creating
and editing models using the SectroCloud tool-support is
manageable for systems containing up to eighty nodes. In
terms of scalability and the impact on the visual presen-
tation of models, nodes with multiple incoming and out-
going edges are partially or fully obscured when located
in areas with a high density of nodes. This is further
exacerbated when attempting to present the entirety of
the model in one view, in particular when scaling the
image to an A4 page. This can be partially avoided by
allocating additional work space and providing adequate
spacing between each node, at the cost of creating mod-
els which are not rendered readable when scaled down to
an A4 sized page. Therefore with this limitation in mind,
we have proposed as future work to provide the function-
ality of resizable nodes, in order to reshape nodes which
has a high number of incoming or outgoing edges, such
that edges and labels no longer overlap. A functional-
ity should also be added to support modifications to the
anchor points of edges, where the path of edges can be
manipulated by the developer.
Another observation was regarding the usability of
the tool in terms of the graphical notation and user in-
terface. The participants involved in the development
process have provided comments on the usability of the
tool, noting in comparison to sketching models on pa-
pers and boards, the tool-assisted approach was more
user friendly. Specifically in one case a participant was
involved in a meeting where they were responsible for
presenting system requirements to stakeholders. In this
case they were able to demonstrate in real time, using
the tool, the requirements of the system-under-design
during the video conference.
Regarding the usefulness of the framework, our feed-
back on the ViSion case study, was that the modelling
language helps by providing concepts that are easily as-
sociated with the cloud computing domain and its prop-
erties including virtual resource, physical infrastructure
and infrastructure node. The semi-automated analysis
of cloud environments was also found useful as it en-
abled the identification of threats and security vulner-
abilities, and validation of security constraints, objec-
tives and mechanisms. Although all these could be man-
ually done for small and very simplistic cloud based sys-
tems, the interconnections and size of commonly avail-
able cloud based systems makes such analysis difficult
to perform. Positive feedback was also received for the
secure cloud process indicating that it provides prac-
titioners with a comprehensive approach to the secure
cloud environment framework, ensure that they are able
to consistently understand and apply fundamental activ-
ities throughout the cloud security requirements elicita-
tion process. They also appreciated the fact that during
the activities in the process, the developer is made aware
of the input and output artefacts, as well as the tasks to
be performed during each activity.
The feedback also indicated that an important chal-
lenge that developers face when considering security is-
sues in cloud computing is the need to consider multi-
ple perspectives in order to capture the security needs
of cloud actors. It was suggested that our framework
addresses such challenge by by providing a modelling
language with the expressive power needed to describe
cloud security needs at a high level of abstraction, with-
out omitting technical details. This is supported by the
three separate views of a cloud model, representing re-
finements at the organisational, application and infras-
tructure level. Each view allows developers to focus on
the concepts and relationships represented from a spe-
cific perspective, culminating in a holistic cloud model
with varying levels of granularity.
6 Related Work
There are many works in the state of the art which sur-
veys current work to determine a standard definition
for cloud computing [1–4]. Vaquero et al. studies over
twenty definitions in order to extract a consensus and
the minimum set of essential characteristics [1]. Foster
et al. discusses the overlap between the cloud paradigm
and existing technologies such as grid computing and
distributed systems in [2]. Both [1] and [2] make com-
parisons between the grid paradigm and cloud comput-
ing, noting the similarities and highlighting the differ-
ences. For example virtualisation existed before cloud
computing, however it enables key cloud computing fea-
tures such as on-demand resource pooling and security
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Fig. 15 Fragment of the model in the VisiOn case study.
by isolation. Qian et al. provides a reference architecture
of the cloud through a core stack and the management,
where the core stack consists of three layers; resource,
platform and application [3]. Qian et al. also provide a
classification of cloud computing using two categories;
service boundary and service type. They relate the con-
text of each category to the target user group, such
as enterprises, developers and external parties. Moreno-
Vozmediano et al. presents the concept of services avail-
able on the Internet in the Internet of Services (IoS)
model [5]. In their view some of the challenges encoun-
tered in cloud computing are based on areas that are
already defined in the existing literature, such as vir-
tualisation, grid computing and automated computing.
Zhang et al. divides the cloud computing environment
into four layers; the hardware/datacenter layer, the in-
frastructure layer, the platform layer and the application
layer [6]. Zhang et al. examine the challenges in cloud
data security, outlining the responsibility of infrastruc-
ture providers to maintain confidentiality when access-
ing and transferring data and ensuring the auditability
of application security settings and policies. Due to the
virtualised nature of the cloud environment, the authors
highlight the need for considering security on all four
layers of the cloud computing environment.
The literature in cloud security primary focuses on
mitigating mechanisms and software solutions at the im-
plementation level, which targets software systems that
are already implemented and operational [20]. This ap-
proach is counter to our argument that security is a
factor that is most effective when integrated as early
as possible in the software development life-cycle [17].
In existing requirements engineering approaches we are
able to capture high level concepts such as stakehold-
ers, goals and resources [22], and security concepts such
as vulnerabilities, threats and security constraints [16].
Secure Tropos [16,28] is a goal-oriented software engi-
neering methodology extending the Tropos methodology
to model security concerns throughout the software sys-
tem development process, based on the notion of agents
and related notions such as actors and goals and focus-
ing on the early analysis and design stages. Mouratidis
et al. presents a framework to elicit the security and
privacy requirements of software systems and select a
cloud service provider based on satisfaction of the re-
quirements. They define a modelling language as part
of the process, the language extends from several con-
cepts in the software engineering discipline, such as the
i* framework, PriS [29] and Secure Tropos which pro-
vides specialization in requirements engineering, security
engineering and privacy engineering respectively [30].
However the approaches in [22] and [16] lack the ex-
pressive power to support developers in modelling the
relationship between their organisational, business and
security needs in a cloud computing environment. Specif-
ically existing approaches lack an language expressive
enough to model cloud-specific concepts such as multi-
tenancy, virtualisation and cloud services in the context
of cloud security. Beckers et al. proposes a pattern-based
method to elicit cloud security requirements aimed at
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guiding cloud customers during the process of modelling
cloud systems [23]. However their approach is focused on
establishing an Information Security Management Sys-
tem (ISMS) according to the ISO 27001 standard, with-
out considering the propagation of users cloud security
needs. Li et al. provides a holistic security requirements-
eliciting approach towards socio-technical systems [24].
However their work lacks expressive power for capturing
cloud-specific properties, which is essential for inferring
cloud security issues, impact on resources and mitigation
strategies. Review efforts indicates that while most work
covers multiple security sub-areas, they only target cloud
computing issues in isolation, for example considering se-
curity properties in software systems or human factors
on a social level but failing to provide direct correla-
tion between different conceptual layers [27,25]. Kallo-
niatis et al. presents a methodology towards eliciting and
analysing security and privacy requirements of software
systems and the selection of appropriate cloud deploy-
ment models [31]. Their framework provides a modelling
language based on Secure Tropos [16], the agent-oriented
modelling language i* and the PRiS [29] language, which
incorporates concepts from security requirements engi-
neering and cloud engineering through a systematic pro-
cess. Bandara et al. carries out a comparative evaluation
of model-based security patterns to examine the extent
of support of constructs provided by security require-
ments engineering approaches. They cover three main
categories of modelling approaches; design, goal-oriented
requirements and problem-oriented. Their results sug-
gest that ”current approaches to security engineering
are, to a large extent, capable of incorporating secu-
rity analysis patterns” [32]. Zardari et al. argues that
the Goal Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE)
approach provides a paradigm which addresses the lack
of requirements engineering methodologies applicable in
cloud adoption [33]. To capture user requirements at
various levels of detail, they decompose goals down to
business, core and operational goals. Their proposed life-
cycle facilitates the negotiation and alignment of user
requirements with cloud provider provisioning, taking
into account mismatches, trade-offs and risk manage-
ment. Their outcome is the selection of the optimal cloud
service provider given a set of user requirements. Our
approach focuses on security requirements of cloud sys-
tems from a developers perspective, while taking into
account the security needs of cloud users through con-
straints. We also consider the impact of cloud-specific
characteristics such as virtualisation and multi-tenancy,
implicitly modelling these concepts in the system-under-
design. This allows developers to assess the system from
a cloud perspective, identifying threats unique to cloud
systems.
Our proposed approach ensures that the system-under-
design incorporates security from the early requirements
stage, by providing an expressive modelling language
able to capture cloud computing concepts and charac-
teristics. We achieve this by building upon existing work
in security requirements engineering that lacks the ca-
pability to capture or reason about cloud-specific secu-
rity issues from a holistic point of view [26,16]. Thus
our modelling language captures essential cloud charac-
teristics and security implications in order to progress
towards addressing the security problem in cloud com-
puting [9]. Specifically we model cloud characteristics
such as multi-tenancy, describe cloud service configura-
tions, identify cloud-specific threats and vulnerabilities,
in addition to modelling the impact of attacks on phys-
ical and virtual resource within the context of a cloud
computing system.
7 Conclusion
Currently there is a lack of domain-specific support for
developers during the process of eliciting security needs
in organisational and business systems adapting the cloud
computing paradigm. Our work seeks to fill this gap
by providing a modelling language and a set of anal-
ysis techniques for eliciting secure cloud environment
needs from a requirements engineering perspective, en-
abling developers to realise organisational needs from
a cloud computing context with consideration to secu-
rity needs. In particular in our contributions C1 and
C2 we have defined a modelling language to capture
cloud computing concepts, which enables the modelling
of essential cloud properties required to describe cloud
services. We demonstrate through our work in the Vi-
siOn case study that the language is able to represent
both abstractly and through a fine-grained perspective,
the organisational needs and the relationships required
for modelling cloud security needs. For C3 we have de-
fined a concrete and machine-readable syntax, provid-
ing a method to semi-automate the process of applying
our modelling language following established security re-
quirements engineering concepts. C4 defines three anal-
ysis techniques to identify threats and vulnerabilities in
cloud systems, propose mitigation strategies and provide
transparency in the responsibilities of cloud actors when
managing cloud security requirements. This provides a
rigorous approach for developers to model and address
cloud security needs, threats and mitigation mechanisms
through formal textual and visual notation.
For future work we are investigating methods to align
state-of-the-art security knowledge from public vulnera-
bility and security control repositories with our frame-
work. This would enrich models created using our frame-
work and provide developers the option to semi-automate
the transformation of cloud security controls into secu-
rity patterns, thus providing a pattern library for ap-
plying security policies and mechanisms from a security
requirements perspective.
Security Patterns Currently the SectroCloud mod-
ule does not support importing security patterns to a
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cloud environment model. While initial efforts have been
taken to identify patterns from several domains in the
Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) provided by the Cloud
Security Alliance (CSA), the process of replicating these
security patterns using tool support is manual. This in-
volves the creation of security controls as models us-
ing concepts from our proposed language, which can be
saved as a pattern using the SectroCloud tool support.
The bulk of the work is in devising a method for the
automated transformation of security patterns from ex-
pert databases to our proposed language. Further work
is needed to allow the importing and exporting of pat-
terns in the tool support, for example replicating a set of
security mechanisms to mitigate a specific vulnerability
and generating the pattern through our concepts in an
existing model. Therefore the automated transformation
of cloud security controls into security patterns through
tool support will provide practitioners with an extend-
able library of security patterns, consisting of industry
standard solutions.
Scalability and Usability of SectroCloud The
focus of the SectroCloud module was to provide semi-
automated tool support for practitioners, allowing the
visual modelling of cloud computing systems using our
cloud security concepts. Further investigation of the scal-
ability of the visual component can improve the usability
of the tool, as the effect of the complexity of visual mod-
els on the decision making process has not yet been stud-
ied within the scope of this work. Two features have been
proposed to address the visual clutter of complex mod-
els; (i) enabling the manual resizing and scaling of nodes,
(ii) allowing the addition of anchor points on edges. Sup-
porting the resizing of nodes would allow developers to
manually adjust the scale of each node in the model, in
order to reduce the amount of overlap over edges and
labels in complex models. The support for manual ma-
nipulation of edges in the model would allow developers
to reshape edges which overlap, further reducing visual
clutter. These two proposed features is aimed at improv-
ing the usability of the tool-support, while addressing the
visual component of the scalability issue.
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